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he recent cycle of revolutions in Arab 
countries has caught policy-makers and 
experts off guard. The decades-long 
kleptocracy, systemic corruption, economic 
stagnation and censorship are merely some of 
named causes accounting for the shake-up of the 
old order in Europe’s Southern Neighbourhood. 
The choices that citizens were deprived of 
making through the ballot box have been 
accomplished by taking to the streets. Policy-
makers and analysts are contemplating the 
possible scenarios for the countries that have 
finally brought down their dictators. EU leaders 
are debating support they can provide to help in 
the establishment of ‘good governance.’ 
Meanwhile questions are being asked about the 
possible implications of the successful 
revolutions beyond the Arab world and 
especially for the EU’s Eastern neighbours. In his 
recent speech, the President of the European 
Council, Herman Van Rompuy, stated: 
“Although recent developments concentrated 
our political attention to the South, we certainly 
cannot afford to forget about the Union’s Eastern 
neighbourhood.” 
The EU’s Eastern neighbours have already 
witnessed regime changes through the colour 
revolutions in mid-2000s. Georgia’s ‘Rose 
Revolution’ brought pro-Western leader 
Saakashvili to power who implemented 
considerable economic and institutional reforms 
and tackled the long-existing tradition of 
government corruption. However, Saakashvili’s 
personal style of governance and the war with 
Russia that cost Georgia possibly irrevocably loss 
of control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia have 
been widely criticized. The ‘Orange Revolution’ 
in Ukraine saw a dismal fate. Yushchenko and 
Timoshenko assumed the leadership due to the 
civic activism of pro-democracy forces. However, 
constant struggle between the leaders as well as 
their unwillingness or inability to address 
systemic corruption and other economic 
problems led to their losing power to 
Yanukovych, who is fast moving towards 
forming an autocratic regime. In Ukraine’s 
neighbouring Moldova, democratic forces are 
still struggling to implement internal reforms 
aiming at better governance. By contrast, both 
Belarus and Azerbaijan have recently seen the 
further tightening of their dictatorships. 
Crackdowns on demonstrators and 
imprisonment of opposition leaders and activists 
have followed the re-election campaigns of both 
Lukashenko and Aliyev. However, in response, 
the EU was much tougher towards Belarus than 
Azerbaijan, which is presumably explained by 
the oil factor. In any case, the opposition was 
silenced in both countries, at least for now, and 
the threat of regime change appears delayed.  
And then there is Armenia, which since 
independence has had a ‘bumpy ride’ towards 
democracy. The phrase used 20 years ago – 
“Armenia is a county in transition” – is still often 
repeated today. It can even be argued that the 
country is de-democratizing. Although its 
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citizens have taken to the streets a number of 
times demanding the president’s resignation, 
attempts at mounting a ‘colour revolution’ have 
been unsuccessful so far. The transfers of power 
have been orchestrated behind the scenes. The 
first president Levon Ter-Petrossyan resigned in 
1998, following disagreement within the 
government concerning the settlement of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict, and the second 
president Robert Kocharyan handed power over 
to his closest ally Serj Sargsyan in 2008. Apart 
from the first presidential election right after 
independence, which was proclaimed 
transparent and fair, all the following 
presidential elections saw serious pre- and post-
electoral violations. Thus, regime reform or 
change through the ballot box has not been a 
workable option up to now. 
However, the political landscape has shifted 
since the first president, Ter-Petrosyan, staged 
his comeback in 2008 as presidential candidate of 
the main opposition alliance – the Armenian 
National Congress (ANC). Although not all 
opposition parties are united in the ANC, Ter-
Petrosyan’s return ensured the strong opposition 
leadership that had been hitherto absent. He and 
his allies have been pointing out the current 
regime’s unwillingness to implement political 
and economic reforms, the results of which are 
high unemployment, the increasing gap between 
rich and poor, restrictions on freedom of speech 
and assembly, as well as the monopolization of 
the larger businesses by oligarchs and the 
member of ruling political elite. Ter-Petrosyan 
himself has labelled the government as a 
‘bandidokratia.’ Following the presidential 
election of 2008, which was neither fair, nor 
transparent, peaceful demonstrators took to the 
streets in support of Ter-Petrosyan. On 1 March 
2008, police forces moved in to disperse the 
crowd. Hundreds of demonstrators were 
arrested (9 activists are still in prison), hundreds 
were injured and ten people lost their lives. The 
ANC alleges that the army too participated in 
dispersing the demonstrators.  
After this tragically violent episode, the 
opposition has continuously formulated political 
demands. Small and medium-scale 
demonstrations have continued to be organized. 
However, following successful revolts in the 
Arab world, since 18 February 2011 the 
Armenian opposition intensified its 
demonstrations aiming to achieve regime change. 
On the one hand, ANC leaders demand 
extraordinary presidential and parliamentary 
elections. On the other hand, they do not deny 
the possibility of regime change through a so-
called ‘social explosion’. The ANC currently 
spares no efforts to draw parallels between the 
situation in the Arab world and Armenia. 
Censorship, corruption and kleptocracy are cited 
repeatedly. For its part the ruling elite dismisses 
the seriousness of these comparisons, citing 
cultural, religious and geopolitical differences. 
Yet, in doing so, the authorities misrepresent the 
reasons for the Arab revolt, which have to do 
with political, social and economical conditions, 
rather than with religious, cultural or 
geopolitical circumstances. Moreover, the 
governmental officials refer to Armenia’s 
substantial macroeconomic growth up until the 
global financial crisis stage, and blame the 
economic slowdown and increase in prices on 
the global recession. However, the ruling regime 
neglects the complaint that the fruits of the 
growth have not been fairly distributed. The 
ruling political elite and oligarchs were the main 
beneficiaries, and the average citizen did not 
profit much from the economic growth. 
Furthermore, governmental officials also claim 
to be making efforts to combat corruption. Yet, 
they are silent about the fact that no charges 
have been brought against any high level official 
to date. 
Nagorno-Karabakh is another essential factor in 
the ongoing opposition-government ‘debate.’ 
Members of the ruling elite state that resolving 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict requires, inter 
alia, a politically stable Armenia; therefore, if the 
ANC destabilizes the country through 
demonstrations, it might harm the interests of 
Nagorno-Karabakh and disrupt the peace 
process. For its part ANC leaders argue that the 
calling of extraordinary elections would not 
undermine Armenia’s stability. They also stress 
that the current president has not only failed to 
resolve the conflict, but also made considerable 
concessions in the negotiations, and even that a 
regime change is imperative for ‘saving 
Nagorno-Karabakh’.’ 
The Russia factor, although scarcely raised 
publicly, also plays an important role in the 
context of the power struggle in Armenia. 
Although Russia has adopted the doctrine of 
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‘non-intervention’ in domestic affairs of third 
countries, it appears to be backing Armenia’s 
current authorities and exercises considerable 
influence inside Armenia. Along with the United 
States and France, Russia co-chairs the Minsk 
Group of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) that is intended to 
mediate the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. Russia and Armenia are members of 
both the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organization (CSTO). In addition, Russian 
troops are guarding Armenia’s border with 
Turkey and Iran, and Armenia is largely 
dependent on Russia for the gas and oil supplies.  
The ANC held its first ‘big rally’ since the 
beginning of the current Arab revolutions on 1 
March 2011, which also marked the third 
anniversary of the fatal post-election violence. To 
mobilize support, opposition activists handed 
out leaflets on streets, and used a few 
uncensored online and printed newspapers as 
well as Facebook and Twitter. There were no 
announcements about the upcoming 
demonstration through the TV channels, which 
are entirely controlled by the government. Police 
intimidated activists both in the capital and in 
the regions to deter their participation in rallies 
or their organization. The authorities went to 
great length to disrupt the movement of ANC 
supporters from the regions to Yerevan. Public 
transportation connecting the major cities to the 
capital did not function. Police patrolled the 
main highways connecting the regions with 
Yerevan. Nonetheless, ANC supporters took to 
the streets. According to the police, 9,000-10,000 
people gathered for the rally. The ANC estimates 
50,000 participants. During the demonstration, 
Ter-Petrosyan presented the ANC’s demands in 
a 15-points declaration directed mainly to the 
current regime in Armenia.  
 
Summary of 15-point demand presented by Armenia’s first president and current opposition leader 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan on 1 March 2011 
1. Before the visit of the Council of Europe Co-Rapporteurs on Armenia (15 March 2011), release all nine 
prisoners sentenced for their political views and activities. 
2. Establish an independent international commission or reinstate the ‘Fact-Finding Group’ by 
including in it international experts for the purpose of revealing and punishing (according to law) 
those responsible for the monstrous crimes of 1 March 2008. 
3. Compensate the material damages of all citizens who suffered from the events of 1 March 2008, 
especially those who suffered injuries and the families of those who were killed. 
4. End police warnings, threats and restrictions aimed at stopping the participation of citizens in rallies 
and political activities in general. 
5. Implement the non-appealable verdict by the European Court and reinstate the ‘A1+’ TV Company 
as well as put an end to the government’s control over online media. 
6. Stop the authorities’ belligerent rhetoric and reinstate the previous format of negotiations ensuring 
the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations as a full party. 
7. Reverse the decisions prohibiting open-air street trade, disallowing the small stores to work after 8 
p.m. and compulsory car insurance. 
8. Eliminate the illegal levying of VAT on cars imported for personal use (but not those destined for 
sale). 
9. Raise the minimum monthly salary to $200, the unemployment benefits to $100 and the average 
pension to $112. 
10. Remove the proposal to revise Article 142 of the RA Labour Code from the National Assembly’s 
agenda, according to which setting a 6-day working schedule is subject to the employer’s discretion. 
11. Introduce state subsidies for production of the most important agricultural goods by taking into 
consideration the market price and the strategic location (bordering regions). 
12. Publish the properties and income of the previous and current highest-ranking state officials and 
their families, starting with the presidents, prime ministers, ministers, deputy ministers, governors, 
mayors through to judges, prosecutors, generals and deputies of the National Assembly (formerly the 
Supreme Council). 
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13. Fire the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the head of the central bank, RA prosecutor 
general, etc. for the reasons of mismanagement and incompetence. 
14. Calls on international organizations, the United States and the EU member governments to put an 
end to their unconditional support of Armenia’s dictatorial regime based on geopolitical 
considerations. 
15. In the event that these demands or a substantial part of them are fulfilled, the ANC will begin to 
engage in a practical dialogue with the authorities over a single agenda item: the issue of 
extraordinary presidential and parliamentary elections in the upcoming months. 
 
March 1st, 2011 marked a turning point in 
Armenian politics. The opposition is certainly 
revitalized, with some ANC leaders even 
declaring that ‘victory is guaranteed’. But the 
authorities are expected to resist their demands. 
Therefore, political tensions are expected to 
escalate, which prompts us to contemplate four 
possible scenarios for future developments in 
Armenia: 
a) The status quo is maintained. The Armenian 
authorities are able to suppress the opposition 
and keep their grip on power. Yet this course 
of action is improbable, given the growing 
activism of the opposition and increasing 
dissatisfaction among the population on 
economic, social and political fronts. 
b) Members of the ruling elite introduce political 
and economic reforms. A transparent effort is 
made to counter corruption, ensure protection 
of human rights and stop the censorship of 
media (especially TV channels). As a result 
the government eases public dissatisfaction 
and counters the opposition’s criticism.  
Nevertheless, this scenario is doubtful because 
the ruling coalition is fragmented and would 
hardly agree on implementation of reforms 
that involves compromise. 
c) The authorities leave the situation unchanged 
and focus on repressing the opposition. The 
latter continues the demonstrations and is 
likely to succeed in taking over power. 
However, the new government will need to 
embark on a wave of real reforms in a 
reasonable timeframe, which may still be a 
bumpy road but, nonetheless, critical for its 
own endurance.  
d) The opposition seizes power but makes 
merely ‘declaratory’ reforms continuing 
‘business as usual’ and the ground is laid for 
the next revolution, i.e. a return to scenario a. 
This is not an implausible model, of which 
several Latin American countries have had 
considerable experience in the last half 
century.  
In any case, the EU needs to be prepared for each 
of these possible scenarios. If scenario a takes 
place, possible sanctions could be introduced by 
the Union, especially in the areas of aid and 
trade (including targeted sanction against some 
governmental officials) in order to push 
Armenian authorities to implement the reforms 
that have been promised during the last 20 years. 
In case either scenario b or c materialises, the EU 
would be able to take a more interactive role in 
supporting the government to undergo the 
necessary and long-overdue transition to full-
fledged democracy. Given the past experiences, 
the EU should require the Armenian government 
to present a visible and measurable programme 
for reforms that would be assessed on a regular 
basis to avoid a return to scenario a. 
‘Colour revolutions’ do not always progress 
peacefully and produce desirable results. The 
Arab world has just seen two relatively smooth 
regime changes. Yet Libya is drifting towards 
civil war. At this stage, the outcome in Armenia 
is unclear. However, it seems quite possible that 
the coming months will see developments of 
major if not decisive importance for the future of 
the country. There are also several objective 
factors that are relatively favourable for the 
chances of a successful regime change in 
Armenia, in notable contrast to the situation in 
much of North Africa: a credible opposition 
leadership exists, civil society structures are well 
established and there is the huge Armenian 
diaspora of talented professional people able and 
willing to join in their country’s recovery. For its 
part, the EU needs to be prepared to play the role 
of the serious and responsible neighbour it has 
claimed to be for so long. The revolutions of the 
Arab world caught everyone by surprise. The EU 
will have no plausible excuse in the case of 
Armenia. 
